AirportNet Home AAAE Members Only AAAE Meetings Information Library Today's News Search AirportNet

GAO Report - Aviation Safety: Targeting and Training of FAA's Safety Inspector Workforce

Aviation Safety: Targeting and Training of FAA's Safety Inspector
Workforce (Testimony, 04/30/96, GAO/T-RCED-96-26).

GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) safety
inspection program. GAO noted that: (1) in 1991, FAA created its Safety
Performance Analysis System (SPAS) to focus its inspection resources on
the pilots, aircraft, and facilities that pose the greatest risk; (2)
poor data quality jeopardizes the success of SPAS; (3) FAA officials
have not fully responded to prior recommendations of adopting a strategy
to improve data quality by the end of 1995; (4) FAA inspectors have
performed inspections without the appropriate or up-to-date credentials;
(5) FAA has had trouble training its inspectors because it does not
offer the necessary courses and has limited aircraft-specific training
and decreased the frequency of inspector flight training; (6) between
fiscal year (FY) 1993 and FY 1996, funding for technical training
decreased 42 percent; and (7) FAA expects a $20-million shortfall for
technical training it identified as essential for FY 1996.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     TITLE:  Aviation Safety: Targeting and Training of FAA's Safety 
             Inspector Workforce
      DATE:  04/30/96
   SUBJECT:  Budget cuts
             Commercial aviation
             Safety regulation
             Human resources training
             Aircraft maintenance
             Aircraft pilots
             Transportation safety
             Personnel management
             Aircraft accidents
IDENTIFIER:  FAA Safety Performance Analysis System
             FAA Program Tracking and Reporting System
             Boeing 727 Aircraft
             Boeing 767 Aircraft
             Boeing 737 Aircraft
             DC-9 Aircraft
             Airbus 320 Aircraft
             Boeing 757 Aircraft
             MD-80 Aircraft
             NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO report.  Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved.  Major          **
** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters,    **
** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and       **
** single lines.  The numbers on the right end of these lines   **
** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the      **
** document outline.  These numbers do NOT correspond with the  **
** page numbers of the printed product.                         **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO   **
** Document Distribution Center.  For further details, please   **
** send an e-mail message to:                                   **
**                                                              **
**                    <>                        **
**                                                              **
** with the message 'info' in the body.                         **

================================================================ COVER

Before the Subcommittee on Governmental Management,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S.  Senate

For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
9:30 a.m.  EDT
April 30, 1996


Statement of Gerald L.  Dillingham, Associate Director,
Transportation and Telecommunications Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division




=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOT IG - Department of Transportation Inspector General
  FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
  GPS - global positioning system
  PTRS - Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem
  SPAS - Safety Performance Analysis System

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) safety inspection program.  Although the
accident rates for air travel in this country are among the lowest in
the world and aviation is one of the safest means of transportation,
recent fatal accidents have raised concerns about the safety of air
travel.  FAA's Office of Flight Standards Service develops the
federal aviation regulations that airlines must follow and prepares
guidance on how FAA safety inspectors should perform inspections. 
This office also inspects commercial and general aviation aircraft,
aircraft repair stations, schools for pilot training and maintenance,
and pilots.  These inspections serve as part of an early warning
system to identify potential safety-related problems.  Our testimony
today draws on our work since 1987 on FAA's targeting of inspection
resources and its inspector training.\1 In addition, we interviewed
about 50 inspectors for this and other work and have incorporated
their comments on training where relevant to the issues discussed in
this testimony.  The comments made by these inspectors are not
projectable to FAA's entire inspection training program, but their
views and ongoing work by the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General (DOT IG) indicate that long-standing problems with
inspector training continue to exist. 

In summary, we have found that

  -- FAA needs to target its inspection resources to the areas of
     greatest potential risk.  Because of the magnitude of the
     inspectors' workload, targeting is essential because FAA may
     never have enough resources to inspect all pilots, aircraft, and
     facilities.  Since 1991, FAA has been working to develop its
     Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS) to target resources
     for aviation inspections.  However, problems with the quality of
     the source data, such as data on the results of safety
     inspections, jeopardize the potential benefits of the
     $32-million SPAS system.  We recommended in February 1995 that
     FAA develop a comprehensive strategy to improve the quality of
     these data.  FAA officials planned to develop such a strategy by
     the end of 1995, but the strategy drafted by an FAA contractor
     has yet to receive agency approval. 

  -- Over the last decade, we, the DOT IG, and FAA have reported on
     problems related to the technical training for inspectors,
     including inspectors performing inspections for which they did
     not have appropriate or current credentials.  Our work has shown
     persistent problems with FAA's training of inspectors. 
     Specifically, inspectors have been unable to take courses that
     they believe are necessary to perform their inspection
     responsibilities.  Additionally, FAA has limited
     aircraft-specific training and decreased the frequency of flight
     training for inspectors responsible for overseeing pilot
     proficiency.  Decreases in FAA's overall budget have reduced the
     funding available for technical training by 42 percent from
     fiscal years 1993 through 1996.  FAA estimates that it will have
     a shortfall of $20 million for technical training that FAA had
     identified as essential in its fiscal year 1996 training needs
     assessment process. 

\1 Related GAO Products are listed at the end of this testimony. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

As early as 1987, we identified the need for FAA to develop criteria
for targeting safety inspections to airlines with characteristics
that may indicate safety problems and noted that targeting was
important because FAA may never have enough resources to inspect all
aircraft, facilities, and pilots.  FAA employs about 2,500 aviation
safety inspectors to oversee about 7,300 scheduled commercial
aircraft, more than 11,100 charter aircraft, about 184,400 active
general aviation aircraft, about 4,900 repair stations, slightly more
than 600 schools for training pilots, almost 200 maintenance schools,
and over 665,000 active pilots. 

Although FAA has taken steps to better target its inspection
resources to areas with the greatest safety risks, these efforts are
still not complete.  SPAS, which FAA began developing in 1991, is
intended to analyze data from up to 25 existing databases that
contain such information as the results of airline inspections and
the number and the nature of aircraft accidents.  This system is then
expected to produce indicators of an airline's safety performance,
which FAA will use to identify safety-related risks and to establish
priorities for FAA's inspections.  FAA completed development and
installation of the initial SPAS prototype in 1993.  As of April
1996, FAA had installed SPAS in 59 locations but is experiencing some
logistical problems in installing SPAS hardware and software.  Full
deployment of the $32-million SPAS system to all remaining FAA
locations nationwide is scheduled to be completed in 1998. 

In February 1995, we reported that although FAA had done a credible
job in analyzing and defining the system's user requirements, SPAS
could potentially misdirect FAA resources away from the higher-risk
aviation activities if the quality of its source data is not
improved.\2 SPAS program officials have acknowledged that the quality
of information in the databases that are linked to SPAS poses a major
risk to the system.  To improve the quality of data to be used in
SPAS analyses, we recommended that FAA develop and implement a
comprehensive strategy to improve the quality of all data used in its
source databases.  FAA concurred with the need for this comprehensive
strategy and planned to complete it by the end of 1995.  As of April
1996, the strategy drafted by an FAA contractor had not been approved
by agency management.  Until FAA completes and implements its
strategy, the extent and the impact of the problems with the quality
of the system's data will remain unclear. 

Although we have not determined the full extent of the problems, our
recent audit work and recent work by the DOT IG have identified
continuing problems with the quality of data entered into various
source databases for SPAS.  FAA's Program Tracking and Reporting
Subsystem (PTRS), which contains the results of safety inspections,
has had continuing problems with the accuracy and consistency of its
data.  Several FAA inspectors mentioned concerns about the
reliability and consistency of data entered into PTRS.  According to
an inspector who serves on a work group to improve SPAS data inputs,
reviews of inspectors' entries revealed some inaccurate entries and a
lack of standardization in the comment section, where inspectors
should report any rules, procedures, practices, or regulations that
were not followed.  He said inspectors continued to comment on things
that were not violations while some actual violations went
unreported.  For example, during our ongoing work we recently found a
PTRS entry indicating an inspection that never occurred on a type of
aircraft that the carrier did not use.  The DOT IG also concluded in
a November 1995 report that FAA inspectors did not consistently and
accurately report their inspection results in PTRS because reporting
procedures were not interpreted and applied consistently by FAA
inspectors, and management oversight did not identify reporting
inconsistencies.\3 The DOT IG recommended that FAA clarify PTRS
reporting procedures to ensure consistent and accurate reporting of
inspections and to establish controls to ensure supervisors review
PTRS reports for reporting inconsistencies and errors.  Such problems
can jeopardize the reliability of SPAS to target inspector resources
to airlines and aircraft that warrant more intensive oversight than

\2 Aviation Safety:  Data Problems Threaten FAA Strides on Safety
Analysis System (GAO/AIMD-95-27, Feb.  8, 1995). 

\3 Surveillance of Pilot Schools:  Federal Aviation Administration,
Office of Inspector General, U.S.  Department of Transportation,
R9-FA-002, (Nov.  8, 1995). 

---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Over the last decade, we, the DOT IG, and internal FAA groups have
repeatedly identified problems and concerns related to the technical
training FAA has provided to its inspectors.  For example, both we
and the IG have reported that FAA inspectors were inspecting types of
aircraft that they had not been trained to inspect or for which their
training was not current.  In the wake of these findings, FAA has
revised its program to train inspectors by (1) developing a process
to assess training needs for its inspector workforce, (2) attempting
to identify those inspections that require aircraft-specific training
and limiting this training to the number of inspectors needed to
perform these inspections, and (3) decreasing the requirements for
recurrent flight training for some of its inspectors. 

However, our interviews with 50 inspectors indicate that some
inspectors continue to perform inspections for which they are not
fully trained, and some inspectors do not believe they are receiving
sufficient training.  While we cannot determine the extent of these
problems from our limited interviews, the training issues reflect
persistent concerns on which we and others have reported for many
years.  For example, we reported in 1989 that airworthiness
inspectors received about half of the training planned for them in
fiscal year 1988.\4 Furthermore, we reported in 1989 and the DOT IG
reported again in 1992 that inspectors who did not have appropriate
training or current qualifications were conducting flight checks of
pilots.\5 The Director of FAA's Office of Flight Standards Service
acknowledged that the adequacy of inspector training remains a major
concern of inspectors. 

\4 Aviation Training:  FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors Are Not
Receiving Needed Training (GAO/RCED-89-168, Sept.  2, 1989). 

\5 Audit of Aviation Inspection Program:  Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Inspector General, U.S.  Department of
Transportation, R6-FA-2-084, (May 29, 1992). 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

Recognizing that some of its employees had received expensive
training they did not need to do their jobs while others did not
receive essential training, in 1992 FAA developed a centralized
process to determine, prioritize, and fund its technical training
needs.  This centralized process is intended to ensure that funds are
first allocated for training that is essential to fulfilling FAA's
mission.  In accordance with this process, each FAA entity has
developed a needs assessment manual tailored to the entity's
activities and training needs.  For example, the manual for the
Flight Standards Service outlines five categories of training.  The
highest priority is operationally essential training, which is
defined as training required to provide the skills needed to carry
out FAA's mission.  The other four categories, which are not
considered operationally essential, involve training to enhance FAA's
ability to respond to changes in workload, to use new technologies,
to enhance individual skills, or to provide career development.  To
identify initial course sequences for new hires and time frames for
their completion as well as some continuing development courses that
are not aircraft-specific, FAA created profiles for the various types
of inspectors. 

Although each profile notes that additional specialized training may
be required according to an inspector's assigned responsibilities and
prior experience, the centralized process provides no guidance for
analyzing individualized needs.  According to several inspectors we
interviewed who had completed initial training, they were not
receiving the specific technical training needed for their assigned
responsibilities.  The inspectors said that the assessment process
does not fully address their advanced training needs and that some
inspectors were performing inspections for which they have not
received training.  For example, one maintenance inspector told us he
was responsible for inspecting seven commuter airlines but had never
attended maintenance training school for the types of aircraft he
inspects.  He said that he had requested needed training for 5 years
with his supervisor's approval, but his requests were not ranked high
enough in the prioritization process to receive funding.  Instead,
FAA sent the maintenance inspector to training on Boeing 727s and
composite materials, which were not related to the aircraft he was
responsible for.  He said that he did not request these courses and
assumed he was sent to fill available training slots.  Another
maintenance inspector said that although he was trained on modern,
computerized Boeing 767s, he was assigned to carriers who fly 727s,
737s, and DC-9s with older mechanical systems. 

While the Director of the Flight Standards Service said that
inspectors could obtain some aircraft-specific training by attending
classes given by the airlines they inspect, inspectors with whom we
spoke said that supervisors have not allowed them to take courses
offered by airlines or manufacturers because their participation
could present a potential conflict of interest if the courses were
taken for free.  Some inspectors we interviewed said that when they
could not obtain needed training through FAA they have audited an
airline's classes while inspecting its training program.  Although
the inspectors might acquire some knowledge by auditing an airline's
class, they stressed that learning to oversee the repair of complex
mechanical and computerized systems and to detect possible
safety-related problems requires concentration and hands-on learning,
not merely auditing a class.  The inspectors said that extensive
familiarity with the aircraft and its repair and maintenance enhances
their ability to perform thorough inspections and to detect
safety-related problems. 

While technical training is especially important when inspectors
assume new responsibilities, other inspectors we interviewed said
that they sometimes do not receive this training when needed.  For
example, although an operations inspector requested Airbus 320
training when a carrier he inspected began using that aircraft, he
said that he did not receive the training until 2 years after that
carrier went out of business.  Similarly, several inspectors told us
that despite their responsibility to approve global positioning
system (GPS) receivers, a navigation system increasingly being used
in aircraft, they have had no formal training on this equipment. 
Finally, a maintenance inspector, who was responsible for overseeing
air carriers and repair stations that either operate or repair Boeing
737, 757, 767, and McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft, said that the
last course he received on maintenance and electronics was 5 years
ago for the 737.  Although the other three aircraft have replaced
mechanical gauges with more sophisticated computer systems and
digital displays, the inspector has not received training in these
newer technologies.  While acknowledging the desirability of updating
training for new responsibilities, the Director of the Flight
Standards Service said that prioritizing limited training resources
may have defined essential training so narrowly that specialized
training cannot always be funded. 

The Acting Manager of FAA's Flight Standards National Field Office,
which oversees inspector training, told us that to improve training
programs for inspectors FAA is also providing training through such
alternative methods as computer-based instruction, interactive
classes televised via satellite, and computer-based training
materials obtained from manufacturers.  However, the effectiveness of
these initiatives depends on how FAA follows through in promoting and
using them.  For example, while FAA has developed a computer-based
course to provide an overview of GPS, the course is not currently
listed in the training catalogue for the FAA Academy.  We found that
several inspectors who had requested GPS training were unaware of
this course.  According to the Manager of the Regulatory Standards
and Compliance Division of the FAA Academy, their lack of awareness
may be because the course is sponsored by a different entity of FAA,
the Airway Facilities Service.  If this GPS course meets inspectors'
needs, they could be informed of its availability through a special
notice and by cross-listing it in FAA's training catalogue.  The
extent to which inspectors will use distance learning equipment
(e.g., computer-based instruction) and course materials depends in
great part on their awareness of existing courses and whether the
equipment and software are readily available. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

Because of resource constraints, FAA has reduced the number of
inspections for which aircraft-specific training is considered
essential and has limited such training to inspectors who perform
those inspections.  For example, FAA requires inspectors to have
pilot credentials (type ratings by aircraft) when they inspect
commercial aircraft pilots during flight.  FAA has a formula to
determine how many inspectors each district office needs to perform
inspections requiring aircraft-specific skills.  A district office
must perform a minimum number of aircraft-specific inspections each
year to justify training for that type of aircraft.  Offices that
perform fewer than the minimum number of inspections that require
specialized skills may borrow a "resource inspector" from FAA
headquarters or a regional office.  According to the Director of the
Flight Standards Service, FAA cannot afford to maintain current pilot
credentials for all inspectors so they can conduct pilot inspections. 

However, inspectors interviewed mentioned problems with using
resource inspectors, although we have not determined how pervasive
these problems are.  Some of the inspectors said that they had
difficulties obtaining resource inspectors when needed. 
Additionally, they said that sometimes resource inspectors are not
familiar with the operations and manuals of the airline they are
asked to inspect and may therefore miss important safety violations
of that airline's policies or procedures.  For example, while one
inspector, who had primary responsibility for a carrier that was
adding a new type of aircraft, had to terminate the inspection
because the airline's crew was not operating in accordance with the
carrier's operations manual, the resource inspector who accompanied
him had not detected this problem because he was unfamiliar with that
carrier's specific procedures.  In responding to these concerns, the
Director of the Flight Standards Service acknowledged that the
resource inspector may need to be paired with an inspector familiar
with the airline's manuals. 

According to the Director of the Flight Standards Service and the
Acting Manager of the Evaluations and Analysis Branch, identifying
inspections that require aircraft-specific training and limiting
training to those who perform such inspections has reduced the number
of inspectors who need expensive aircraft-specific flight training. 
They said this policy also helps to ensure that inspections requiring
a type rating are only conducted by inspectors who hold appropriate,
current credentials.  As we recommended in 1989, reevaluating the
responsibilities of inspectors, identifying the number needed to
perform flight checks, and providing them with flight training makes
sense in an era of limited resources for technical training. 

The DOT IG's ongoing work has found differences of opinion and
confusion within FAA about which inspections require
aircraft-specific training and type ratings.  For example, while the
Flight Standards Service training needs assessment manual lists 48
inspection activities for which operations inspectors need
aircraft-specific training,\6 during the DOT IG's ongoing audit the
Acting Manager of the Evaluations and Analysis Branch listed only 15
inspection activities requiring current type ratings.  Until FAA
identifies the specific inspection activities that require
aircraft-specific training or type ratings, it will remain unclear
whether some inspections are being performed by inspectors without
appropriate credentials.  The DOT IG's ongoing study is evaluating
this issue in more detail. 

\6 Operations inspectors generally monitor the operational aspects of
an airline, including pilot certification and performance, flight
crew training, and in-flight record keeping. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.3

We and the DOT IG have previously reported that FAA inspectors making
pilot flight checks either did not have the credentials (type
ratings) or were not current in their aircraft qualifications in
accordance with FAA requirements.  Being current is important because
some inspectors may actually have to fly an aircraft in an emergency
situation.  In May 1993, FAA decreased the frequency of inspector
training and more narrowly defined those inspector activities
requiring type ratings.  Under FAA's previous policy, inspectors
overseeing air carrier operations received actual flight training
(aircraft or simulator flying time) every 6 months to maintain their
qualifications to conduct flight checks on pilots.  FAA now requires
recurrent flight training every 12 months and limits this requirement
to those inspectors who might actually have to assume the controls
(flight crewmember, safety pilot, or airman certification) in
aircraft requiring type ratings.  Because inspectors who ride in the
jump seat would not be in a position to assume control of an
aircraft, they no longer need to remain current in their type
ratings, whereas inspectors of smaller general aviation aircraft who
might actually have to assume the controls, are required to receive
flight training.  However, this annual requirement for general
aviation inspectors has been changed to every 24 months. 

Inspectors we interviewed opposed the change requiring less frequent
flight training.  An operations inspector for general aviation
aircraft believed training every 2 years was inadequate for
inspectors who have to be at the controls every time they conduct a
check ride.  Another inspector, who is type rated in an advanced
transport category aircraft, said he has not received any aircraft
flying time and only half the simulator time he needs. 

According to the Acting Manager of the Evaluations and Analysis
Branch, the decision to reduce the requirements for flight training
was driven by budget constraints, and FAA has not studied the
potential or actual impact of this reduction.  Consequently, it is
unknown whether the change in inspector flight training frequency is
affecting aviation safety.  The Director of the Flight Standards
Service said that FAA has been placed in a position of having to meet
the safety concerns of the aviation industry and the public at a time
when air traffic is projected to continue increasing while resources
are decreasing. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.4

Between fiscal years 1993 and 1996, decreases in FAA's overall budget
have significantly reduced the funding available for technical
training.  FAA's overall training budget has decreased 42 percent
from $147 million to $85 million.  FAA has taken a number of steps
over the years to make its technical training program more efficient. 
For example, the prescreening of air traffic controller trainees has
improved the percentage of students who successfully complete this
training and decreased the number of FAA and contract classes needed. 
Additionally, in response to our recommendation, FAA has limited
expensive flight training to inspectors who require current flight
experience.  FAA has also realized savings from the increased use of
distance learning (e.g., computer-based instruction) and flight
simulation in place of more expensive aircraft training time. 

FAA's reduced funding for technical training has occurred at a time
when it has received congressional direction to hire over 230
additional safety inspectors in fiscal year 1996.  To achieve this
staffing increase, FAA will have to hire about 400 inspectors to
overcome attrition.  New staff must be provided initial training at
the FAA Academy to prepare them to assume their new duties
effectively.  The cost of this training, combined with overall
training budget reductions, constrains FAA's ability to provide its
existing inspectors with the training essential to effectively carry
out FAA's safety mission. 

For fiscal year 1996, FAA's training needs assessment process
identified a need for $94 million to fund operationally essential
technical training.  However, due to overall budget reductions, FAA
was allocated only $74 million for this purpose.  For example, the
budget for Regulation and Certification is $5.2 million short of the
amount identified for operationally essential training.  Specific
effects of this shortfall include:  delaying the training of fourth
quarter inspector new hires until fiscal year 1997; cancellation of
164 flight training, airworthiness, and other classes planned to
serve over 1,700 safety inspectors; and delay of recurrent and
initial training for test pilots who certify the airworthiness of new
aircraft.  Based on the fiscal year 1997 request, the gap between
FAA's request and the amount needed to fund operationally essential
technical training will be even greater in fiscal year 1997, in part
because of training postponed in fiscal year 1996.  Regulation and
Certification, for example, is projecting an $8.1-million shortfall
in operationally essential training. 

FAA's Center for Management Development in Palm Coast, Florida, which
provides management training in areas such as leadership development,
labor-management relations, and facilitator skills, has experienced a
9-percent funding decrease since fiscal year 1993.  At a time when
FAA's overall staffing has decreased from 56,000 in fiscal year 1993
to around 47,600 in fiscal year 1996, these decreases have not been
reflected in the center's costs or level of activity. 

An FAA contractor study completed in April 1995 showed that
co-locating the center with the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City would
result in cost savings of a half million dollars or more per year. 
Specifically, the study estimated that FAA could save between $3.4
million and $6.3 million over the next 10 years by transferring the
center functions to the FAA Academy.  The study also identified such
intangibles as adverse employment impacts in the Palm Coast area that
could be considered in making a relocation decision.  FAA management
currently supports retention of the center.  In reviewing this study,
we have identified potential additional savings that could increase
the savings from relocating this facility to as much as $1 million
annually.  For example, the study estimated that easier commuting
access to Oklahoma City would save $2.5 million in staff time over
the 10-year period, an amount that was not included in the study's
overall savings estimate.  The study also did not consider reducing
or eliminating center staff who duplicate functions already available
at the FAA Academy, such as course registration and evaluation.  In
an era of constrained budgets where funding shortfalls for essential
technical training have become a reality, FAA must find ways to make
the best use of all available training resources.  Moving the
center's functions to the FAA Academy should be seriously
considered--particularly since FAA's 10-year lease on the center
facility expires in August 1997. 

-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.5

Mr.  Chairman, this concludes our statement.  We would be pleased to
respond to questions at this time. 

============================================================ Chapter 1

Aviation Safety:  Data Problems Threaten FAA Strides on Safety
Analysis System (GAO/AIMD-95-27, Feb.  8, 1995). 

FAA Technical Training (GAO/RCED-94-296R, Sept.  26, 1994). 

Aircraft Certification:  New FAA Approach Needed to Meet Challenges
of Advanced Technology (GAO/RCED-93-155, Sept.  16, 1993). 

FAA Budget:  Important Challenges Affecting Aviation Safety,
Capacity, and Efficiency (GAO/T-RCED-93-33, Apr.  26, 1993). 

Aviation Safety:  Progress on FAA Safety Indicators Program Slow and
Challenges Remain (GAO/IMTEC-92-57, Aug.  31, 1992). 

Aviation Safety:  Commuter Airline Safety Would Be Enhanced With
Better FAA Oversight (GAO/T-RCED-92-40, Mar.  17, 1992). 

Aviation Safety:  FAA Needs to More Aggressively Manage Its
Inspection Program (GAO/T-RCED-92-25, Feb.  6, 1992). 

Aviation Safety:  Problems Persist in FAA's Inspection Program
(GAO/RCED-92-14, Nov.  20, 1991). 

Serious Shortcomings in FAA's Training Program Must Be Remedied
(GAO/T-RCED-90-91, June 21, 1990, and GAO/T-RCED-90-88, June 6,

Staffing, Training, and Funding Issues for FAA's Major Work Forces
(GAO/T-RCED-90-42, Mar.  14, 1990). 

Aviation Safety:  FAA's Safety Inspection Management System Lacks
Adequate Oversight (GAO/RCED-90-36, Nov.  13, 1989). 

Aviation Training:  FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors Are Not Receiving
Needed Training (GAO/RCED-89-168, Sept.  14, 1989). 

FAA Staffing:  Recruitment, Hiring, and Initial Training of
Safety-Related Personnel (GAO/RCED-88-189, Sept.  2, 1988). 

Aviation Safety:  Measuring How Safely Individual Airlines Operate
(GAO/RCED-88-61, Mar.  18, 1988). 

Aviation Safety:  Needed Improvements in FAA's Airline Inspection
Program Are Underway (GAO/RCED-87-62, May 19, 1987). 

FAA Work Force Issues (GAO/T-RCED-87-25, May 7, 1987). 

Department of Transportation:  Enhancing Policy and Program
Effectiveness Through Improved Management (GAO/RCED-87-3, Apr.  13,

*** End of document. ***

Return to AAAE/ACI-NA Legislative Affairs

© 2001 AAAE