|
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and
Narcotics (Letter Report, 09/04/96, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on
available explosives and narcotics detection technologies focusing on:
(1) funding for those technologies; (2) characteristics and limitations
of available and planned technologies; and (3) deployment of these
technologies by the United States and foreign countries.
GAO found that: (1) since 1978, the federal government has spent about
$246 million for research and development on explosives detection
technologies and about $100 million on narcotics detection technologies;
(2) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Customs
Service use a variety of equipment such as X-ray technology, hand-held
devices, and dog teams to search for explosives and narcotics; (3) a
number of advanced detection technologies are or will be available to
FAA and Customs, but certain factors such as cost, the impact on
commerce, and detection reliability must be considered; and (4) many
other countries, such as Great Britain, Belgium, and, Germany deploy
explosives detection technologies that do not have FAA approval in the
United States.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD/RCED-96-252
TITLE: Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting
Explosives and Narcotics
DATE: 09/04/96
SUBJECT: Transportation safety
Drug trafficking
Explosives
Inspection
Commercial aviation
Terrorism
Research and development
Law enforcement
Narcotics
Search and seizure
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
September 1996
TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING -
TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETECTING
EXPLOSIVES AND NARCOTICS
GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
(705130/341502)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
IMS - Ion Mobility Spectroscopy
KeV - thousand electron volts
MeV - million electron volts
ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy
R&D - research and development
TSWG - Technical Support Working Group
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-272630
September 4, 1996
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato
United States Senate
The ability to detect explosives and narcotics is increasingly
important to U.S. national security. Explosives are the terrorist's
weapon of choice. Their use against commercial aircraft have led to
loss of lives and weakened confidence in the security of air travel.
Likewise, narcotics trafficking ruins lives, drains billions of
dollars from the economy, and spawns violence that threatens U.S.
communities.
As you requested, we have developed information on explosives and
narcotics detection technologies that are available or under
development. More specifically, this report discusses (1) funding
for those technologies, (2) characteristics and limitations of
available and planned technologies, and (3) deployment of
technologies by the United States and foreign countries. The
appendixes provide detailed information on the most significant types
of technologies available and under development, including brief
summaries of their characteristics, their current status in terms of
development or deployment, the estimated range of prices for the
technologies, and the amount of federal funds spent on the
technologies between fiscal years 1978 and 1996.
This report is one of a series you requested on the role of
technology in explosives and narcotics detection.\1 In recent
testimony, \2 we concluded that an approach should be developed
immediately to address the actions needed to reduce vulnerabilities
in aviation security identified in our classified reports. This
report provides a summary of technologies that should be considered
in addressing the actions needed. A subsequent report will address
issues related to governmentwide coordination of technology
development and deployment.
--------------------
\1 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives
and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27,
1996). Other reports have been classified by executive branch
agencies.
\2 Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The increased threat of terrorism is an urgent national issue. The
President directed the establishment of a commission on July 25,
1996, headed by Vice President Gore, whose charter included reviewing
aviation security. The commission was charged with reporting to the
President within
45 days its initial findings on aviation security, including plans to
(1) deploy technology capable of detecting the most sophisticated
explosive devices and (2) pay for that technology. In a classified
report, we made recommendations to the Vice President, in his
capacity as chairman of the commission, that would enhance the
effectiveness of the commission's work. Detection technologies are
also important in the effort to stem the flow of drugs into the
United States.
Detection technologies are typically developed for specific
applications--some for aviation security, some for drug interdiction,
and some for both. The major applications for the aviation security
efforts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) include the
screening of checked baggage, passengers, cargo, mail, and carry-on
items such as electronics, luggage, and bottles. FAA's need for
detection technology comes from its security responsibilities
involving more than 470 domestic airports and 150 U.S. airlines,
annually boarding over 500 million passengers with their checked
baggage and carry-on luggage, and transporting mail and cargo.
Some advanced detection technologies are commercially available to
serve aviation security applications. However, only one technology
is currently deployed in the United States. That technology is being
operationally tested at two U.S. airports.
Major applications for the drug interdiction efforts of the U.S.
Customs Service include screening of cargo and containers,
pedestrians, and vehicles and their occupants. Customs' need for
detection technology emanates from its responsibilities to control
301 ports of entry. Currently, over 400 million people, almost 120
million cars, and 10 million containers and trucks pass through these
points each year.
Currently, Customs' screening is done manually by inspectors with
relatively little equipment beyond hand-held devices for detecting
false compartments in containers.
The challenges in detecting explosives are significantly different
than the challenges in detecting narcotics, as are the consequences
in not detecting them. Customs and other drug enforcement agencies
are concerned with much larger quantities than are aviation security
personnel. Consequently, greater technical challenges are posed in
attempting to detect explosives that might be used to bring down a
commercial aircraft.
Two general groups of technologies, with modifications, can be used
to detect both explosives and narcotics. The first group uses
X-rays, nuclear techniques involving neutron or gamma ray
bombardment, or electromagnetic waves, such as radio frequency waves.
These technologies show anomalies in a targeted object that might
indicate concealed explosives and narcotics or detect actual
explosives and narcotics. The second group, referred to as trace
detection technologies, uses chemical analyses to identify particles
or vapors characteristic of narcotics or explosives and deposited on,
or surrounding, objects, such as carry-on electronics or surfaces of
vehicles. In addition to technologies, dogs are considered a unique
type of trace detector because they can be trained to respond in
specific ways to smells of narcotics or explosives.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex and
costly mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies. Since
1978, federal agencies have spent about $246 million for research and
development on explosives detection technologies and almost $100
million on narcotics detection technologies. Most of this spending
has occurred since 1990, in response to congressional direction, and
has been for technologies to screen checked baggage, trucks, and
containers.
Difficult trade-offs must be made when considering whether to use
detection technologies for a given application. Chief among those
trade-offs are the extent to which intelligence-gathering and
procedures can substitute for technology or reduce the need for
expensive technology. Decisionmakers also need to evaluate
technologies in terms of their characteristics and limitations. Some
technologies are very effective and could be deployed now, but they
are expensive, slow the flow of commerce, and raise issues of worker
safety. Other technologies could be more widely used, but they are
less reliable. Still others may not be available for several years
at the current pace of development.
Despite the limitations of the currently available technology, some
countries have already deployed advanced explosives and narcotics
detection equipment because of differences in their perception of the
threat and their approaches to counter the threat. Should the United
States start deploying the currently available technologies, lessons
can be learned from these countries regarding their approaches, as
well as capabilities of technology in operating environments. FAA
estimates that use of the best available procedures and technology
for enhancing aviation security could cost as much as $6 billion over
the next 10 years or alternatively about $1.30 per one-way ticket, if
the costs were paid through a surcharge.
SPENDING ON DETECTION
TECHNOLOGIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Since 1978, the federal government has spent about $246 million for
research and development (R&D) on explosives detection technologies,
including over $7 million for ongoing demonstration testing at the
Atlanta, San Francisco, and Manila airports. During the same period,
the government has spent about $100 million for R&D on narcotics
technologies and a little more than $20 million procuring a variety
of equipment to assist Customs inspectors, such as hand-held devices
for detecting false compartments. The majority of the spending has
occurred since 1990.
As shown in table 1, annual R&D spending on explosives detection
technologies fluctuated from $23 million to $28 million during the
first part of this decade, before increasing to $39 million for
fiscal year 1996. The $14 million, or over 50 percent, increase from
fiscal year 1995 is due principally to FAA's funding of demonstration
testing of a technology for screening checked baggage and to the
funding of a counterterrorism application by the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG).\3
Table 1
R&D Spending on Detection Technologies
for Fiscal Years 1978 through 1996\a
(Millions of current-year dollars)
FY78
to
Technology FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 Total
------------------- ------ ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -----
Explosives $78 $23 $28 $28 $25 $25 $39 $246
Narcotics 2 14 16 18 20 14 17 100
======================================================================
Total $80 $36 $45 $46 $45 $39 $55 $346
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Spending for explosives technologies is based on estimates
provided by FAA and TSWG, while narcotics spending is based on
estimates by Customs, DOD, and the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP). Customs was unable to provide estimates of spending
prior to fiscal year 1988. Spending by DOD and ONDCP did not begin
until fiscal years 1991 and 1992, respectively.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Annual spending on narcotics detection technology increased during
the first part of the decade from $14 million to a peak of $20
million in fiscal year 1994 and then dropped $3 million from that
peak, or 15 percent. The reason for this decline is reduced spending
by the Department of Defense (DOD) as it shifted emphasis from one
type of narcotics detection technology to other, less costly types of
technologies to satisfy Customs' needs.
--------------------
\3 The Technical Support Working Group is a National Security
Council-sponsored interagency forum for coordinating research and
development on counterterrorism.
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
The spending on detection technologies that has occurred since 1990
has been due in large part to congressional direction. The Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-604) directed FAA to
increase the pace of its R&D. The act also set a goal of deploying
explosives detection technologies by November 1993. However, it
prohibited FAA from mandating deployment of a particular technology
until that technology had first been certified as capable of
detecting various types and quantities of explosives using testing
protocols developed in conjunction with the scientific community.
FAA initially concentrated its efforts on developing protocols and
technologies for screening checked baggage to address one of the
security vulnerabilities that contributed to the bombing of Pan Am
flight 103 in December 1988. However, the goal of deploying such
technology has still not been met. FAA has certified one system, and
it is being operationally tested at two domestic airports and one
airport overseas.
Congress tasked DOD in 1990 to develop narcotics detection
technologies for Customs and other drug enforcement organizations.
DOD has focused on developing "non-intrusive inspection" technologies
to screen containers without the need for opening them. Customs is
deploying a DOD-developed technology for trucks and empty containers,
but it rejected another DOD-developed technology for fully loaded
containers (see p. 8). Customs has identified containerized cargo
at commercial seaports as its greatest unsolved narcotics detection
requirement. According to Customs, it may be necessary to explore
new methods of financing the systems that are technologically
feasible for seaports, but high in cost.
CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS
OF DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Both aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex mix
of intelligence, procedures, and technologies, which can partially
substitute for each other in terms of characteristics, strengths, and
limitations. For example, FAA evaluates information from the
intelligence community in determining a level of threat and mandating
security procedures appropriate to a specific time and place. These
security procedures include bag matching and passenger profiling.\4
FAA estimates that incorporating bag matching in everyday security
could cost up to $2 billion, while profiling could reduce to 20
percent the number of passengers requiring additional screening. The
Customs' drug interdiction task has an analogous set of procedures
and technologies and trade-offs.
Relevant trade-offs in selecting detection technologies for a given
application involve their characteristics and costs, including issues
of their effectiveness in detecting explosives or narcotics, safety
risks to users of the technology, and impacts on the flow of
commerce. For example, some highly effective technologies could be
deployed now, but they are expensive, raise safety concerns, or slow
the flow of commerce. These trade-offs are required for each of the
major detection technology applications for FAA and Customs.
While areas of overlap exist, FAA's aviation security applications
generally relate to checked baggage, passengers, and carry-on items,
and Customs' drug interdiction applications generally relate to
screening of cargo, containers, vehicles, and baggage. In addition
to detection technologies, teams of dogs and their handlers are used
for both aviation security and drug interdiction applications.
--------------------
\4 Bag matching is a procedure to ensure that a passenger who checks
a bag also boards the flight; if not, the bag is removed. Profiling
is a method of identifying potentially threatening passengers, who
are then subjected to additional security measures. Profiling
reduces the number of passengers requiring additional security
measures.
AVIATION SECURITY
APPLICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
CHECKED BAGGAGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.1
A system is available today for screening checked baggage that has
been certified by FAA as capable of detecting various types and
quantities of explosives likely to be used to cause catastrophic
damage to a commercial aircraft, as is required by the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990. However, the certified system is
costly and has operational limitations, including a designed
throughput of about 500 bags an hour with actual throughput much less
than that number. Other less costly and faster systems are
available, but they cannot detect all the amounts, configurations,
and types of explosive material likely to be used to cause
catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft.
FAA's plans for developing detection technologies for checked baggage
include efforts to improve the certified system, develop new
technologies, and evaluate a mix of technologies. FAA believes that
an appropriate mix of systems that individually do not meet
certification requirements might eventually work together to detect
the amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material that are
required by the act.
Appendix I provides additional information about the various types of
technologies available and under development for screening checked
baggage, including the characteristics and limitations of those
technologies, their status, the estimated range of prices for the
technologies, and federal government funding for the technologies.
PASSENGERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.2
The National Research Council recently reported that X-ray and
electromagnetic technologies produce images of sufficient quality to
make them effective for screening passengers for concealed
explosives.\5 Future development efforts by FAA and TSWG are
generally focusing on devices that detect explosives on boarding
documents passengers have handled and portals that passengers would
walk through. One type of portal uses trace detection technologies
that collect and analyze traces from the passengers' clothing or
vapors surrounding them. The other type uses electromagnetic waves
to screen passengers for items hidden under clothing.
The National Research Council also recently observed that successful
deployment of these technologies is likely to depend on the public's
perception about the seriousness of the threat and the effectiveness
of devices in countering the threat, which might also be considered
intrusive or thought to be a health risk. (See App. II for more
information about the various types of technologies available and
under development for passenger screening.)
--------------------
\5 Airline Passenger Security Screening: New Technologies and
Implementation Issues. Washington, DC: National Academy Press,
1996.
CARRY-ON ITEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.3
Technologies available today for screening carry-ons for hidden
explosives include conventional X-ray machines, an electromagnetic
system, and trace detection devices.\6
FAA has recently developed trace detection standards for inspecting
carry-on electronics for explosives. In addition, FAA has "assessed
as effective," but not certified, three trace detection systems to be
used during periods of heightened security. FAA expects to soon
"assess as effective" three more trace detection systems. The more
expensive trace technologies used for carry-on baggage are capable of
detecting smaller amounts of explosives and narcotics. FAA's future
efforts are expected to include developing an enhanced X-ray device
and screeners for bottles. (See app. III for more detailed
information about technologies for screening carry-on items.)
--------------------
\6 We previously reported on limitations in performance of
conventional X-ray machines and their operators.
DRUG INTERDICTION
APPLICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
<head3<Containers
Tests have shown that fully loaded containers can be effectively
screened for narcotics with available high energy X-ray technologies
(about 8 million electron volts or the equivalent of 50 to 70 times
the energy of a typical airport-passenger X-ray). However, Customs
rejected a DOD-developed high energy technology because it cost $12
million to $15 million per location, required a large amount of land
for shielding, and raised safety concerns. Available low-energy
technologies (the equivalent of 3 to 4 times the energy of a
passenger X-ray) are less costly and safer but cannot penetrate full
containers, so their use is limited to screening for hidden
compartments in empty containers and objects concealed in trucks and
trailers. About 4 to 25 containers per hour can be processed through
low- and high-energy X-ray technologies depending on their
configurations.
According to DOD and Customs officials, future efforts in container
screening will include developing less expensive X-ray systems with
higher energy levels, mobile X-ray systems, and more capable
hand-held trace detection systems. Those efforts will also include
evaluating nuclear-based techniques for inspecting empty tankers at
truck and rail ports.\7 (See
app. IV for additional information about technologies for screening
cargo and containers.)
--------------------
\7 As mentioned earlier, overlap exists in technology applications
for drug interdiction and aviation security. FAA's future air cargo
screening efforts will also include nuclear technologies. Appendix
IV shows that FAA has spent over $5 million developing one specific
nuclear technology for cargo screening, while DOD has spent about $19
million developing the same technology for narcotics screening.
DOG TEAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
Dogs can be trained to alert their handlers upon detecting explosives
and narcotics. FAA-certified dogs are trained to detect various
types of explosive substances that might be concealed in aircraft,
airport vehicles, baggage, cargo, and terminals. Customs' dogs are
trained to detect narcotics and in 1994 almost 6,000 drug seizures
were attributable to dog teams. Currently funded projects include
efforts to develop methods of bringing air samples to the dogs, or
swabs from objects they are to inspect.
CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS OF
DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Despite the limitations of currently available detection
technologies, other countries have deployed some of these
technologies to detect explosives and narcotics because of
differences in their perception of the threat and their approaches to
counter the threat. These countries' experiences provide
opportunities to learn lessons about operational measures taken to
deploy detection technologies, such as the amount of airport
modifications needed to incorporate new technologies and the types of
training provided to the operators of the new equipment, as well as
the actual effectiveness of the technologies.
While Customs has deployed equipment such as hand-held devices, it is
also deploying up to 12 low-energy X-ray systems to screen empty
containers and trucks for narcotics along the Southwest border. On
the other hand, some countries are using high-energy systems to
screen fully loaded containers. The high-energy systems installed at
ports of entry in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and China
would have similar uses at seaports here, but Customs officials told
us that the systems are too new for reliable operational data. They
also told us that tests have not been conducted against Customs'
requirements and the technologies would also be too expensive in the
quantities needed for nationwide deployment.
A high-energy nuclear system is being considered for deployment at
the Euro Tunnel between France and the United Kingdom. The system
would be used to screen for explosives concealed in trucks and their
cargo being transported under the English Channel. This system could
also be used to detect narcotics.
In the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, we
observed governments working closely with airport authorities to
deploy explosives detection technologies. In two countries, airport
authorities have generally embraced an approach that entails
successive levels of review of checked baggage to resolve uncertainty
about checked baggage. This approach can require complex systems for
tracking throughout the entire baggage handling system. Instead of
using only the FAA-certified system for checked baggage, these
countries are using a mix of technologies. Their approach has been
to implement technology that is an improvement on existing technology
or procedures, rather than waiting for perfected technology.
Officials in the two other countries are waiting for the next
generation of explosives detection technologies. They believe that
X-ray technologies have generally reached their limits in detecting
explosives.
All of the countries have also deployed trace detection technology
for screening checked baggage or carry-on items, especially
electronics.
FAA officials told us they cannot mandate the types of approaches
used by other countries, although airlines could voluntarily adopt
them, because of the statutory prohibition against mandating
technology that is not certified.
With a combination of the best available technologies and procedures,
including the use of the certified system for screening checked
baggage, FAA estimates the incremental cost of the most effective
security system for U.S. air travellers to be $6 billion over the
next 10 years. On a per-passenger basis, FAA estimates the
equivalent cost to be about $1.30 per one-way ticket.
Customs and FAA have deployed dog teams widely. Customs has deployed
about 450 dog teams to airports, seaports, and land border ports.
The cost to train a Customs' dog and handler is about $6,000. FAA's
canine explosives detection program includes 29 U.S. airports with a
total of 72 FAA-trained and certified dog teams. Of the 19 largest
U.S. airports, 14 have FAA-trained and certified dogs. The five
airports without certified dogs are Washington-National,
Washington-Dulles, Baltimore-Washington International, New York-John
F. Kennedy, and Honolulu. According to an FAA official, these
airports do not have FAA-certified dog teams because airport
officials are concerned about cost. The cost to train an FAA dog and
handler is about $17,000 and the annual operating cost of a team,
including the handler's salary, is about $60,000.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Five agencies--FAA, DOD, Customs, TSWG, and ONDCP--provided comments
on the technical accuracy of information contained in a draft of this
report. We have incorporated their comments in this final report
where appropriate.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
To determine the amount of federal government spending for R&D on
explosives and narcotics detection technologies, we obtained funding
information from Customs, FAA, DOD, ONDCP, and TSWG covering periods
as far back as the information was available. Although we identified
the historical and current levels of funding, we generally focused on
the period 1990 to the present because most technologies were
developed and deployed during this period.
To obtain information on the characteristics and limitations of
available and planned technologies for containers, checked baggage,
passengers, and carry-on items, we requested project information from
the same five agencies for each detection technology project they had
undertaken since 1990. Additionally, we received briefings from
developers of technology and manufacturers of equipment currently
available on the market.
We analyzed major categories of technologies to identify a few
characteristics common to each that can be used in making
comparisons. We did not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the
technologies, nor did we assess whether the current funding level is
adequate to develop reliable detection technologies.
We interviewed officials and gathered data primarily from the FAA,
DOD, Customs, ONDCP, and TSWG to develop information on available and
planned detection technologies. We also interviewed officials and
visited ports of entry in Miami, Florida; San Juan, Puerto Rico; and
Otay Mesa, California; and airports in Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Vice President of the
United States; Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of appropriate
congressional committees; the Secretaries of Treasury, State,
Defense, and Transportation; the Attorney General, Department of
Justice; the Administrators, FAA and Drug Enforcement Administration;
the Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; and the Directors, ONDCP,
Central Intelligence, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning explosives
detection technology, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202)
512-2834. If you have any questions regarding narcotics detection
technologies, please call David E. Cooper on (202) 512-4841. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
John H. Anderson, Jr.
Director, Transportation and
Telecommunications Issues
Resources, Community, and Economic
Development Division
Louis J. Rodrigues
Director, Defense
Acquisitions Issues
National Security and
International Affairs Division
APPLICATION: CHECKED BAGGAGE\A
=========================================================== Appendix I
Characteristic Unit Price Funding (FYs 78-
Technology s Status Range 96)
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ----------------
X-Ray
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Computerized X-ray source Commercially $850,000 to $1 $22.2 million
Axial rotates around available. million (FAA)
Tomography a bag Achieved
(CAT Scan) obtaining a Federal
large number Aviation
of cross- Administration
sectional (FAA)
images that certification
are integrated in December
by a computer, 1994. FAA
which displays currently
densities of funding
objects in the operational
bag. testing at
three airports
Automatically and also
alarms when funding
objects with projects to
high improve
densities, throughput
characteristic rate, reduce
of explosives, unit cost, and
are detected. improve
overall
Relatively capabilities.
slow Department of
throughput; Defense (DOD)
certified recently
system tested
requires two technology for
units to meet detecting
throughput drugs in small
requirement. packages.
Dual-energy X- Two different Commercially $400,000 $2.1 million
rays X-ray energies available. FAA (FAA)
determine the is developing
densities and an enhanced
average atomic version that
numbers of the may meet
target certification
material. standards. The
U.S. Customs
Currently none Service
of the X-rays (Customs)
in this group plans to test
meets this
certification technology for
standards for drug
checked bags detection.
because they
do not detect
the quantities
and
configurations
of the full
range of
explosives
specified in
the
standards.
X-rays with Backscatter Commercially $100,000 to $100,000
backscatter detects available. FAA $140,000 (Customs)
reflected X- has several $2.2 million
ray energy, projects aimed (FAA)
providing an at assisting
additional this group of
image to X-ray devices
highlight meet
organic certification
materials such standards.
as explosives
and drugs near
the edge of a
bag.
This group of
X-ray devices
generally does
not
automatically
alarm and
therefore
requires an
operator to
interpret the
image.
Coherent X- Technology is FAA and NA\b $4.5 million
ray Scatter based on the Customs (FAA)
(also known as detection of terminated $270,000
X-ray scatter projects due (Customs)
Diffraction) patterns as X- to significant
rays interact technical
with crystal problems. A
lattice foreign
structures of government and
materials. contractor are
supporting
development of
this
technology.
Nuclear
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gamma-Gamma Accelerator DOD is NA $8.6 million
Resonance produces gamma building a (DOD)
Imaging rays that prototype to
penetrate bags demonstrate
to detect proof-of-
presence of principle for
chlorine airport
compounds in baggage
narcotics. carousel
application.
Eventual Demonstration
system is expected in
expected to be December 1996.
very
expensive.
Thermal Neutrons from Six machines $1 million $6.6 million
Neutron a radioactive built and (FAA)
Analysis source probe tested since $280,000 (DOD)
bags for 1989. FAA $27,000
presence of discontinued (Customs)
nitrogen or checked
chlorine baggage
compounds. portion of
project in
Automatically 1994, but it
alarms on is now
explosives or investigating
narcotics. carry-on
application.
Cost, size, DOD contractor
and false now using FAA
alarm rate machines to
were of test drug
concern to detection.
airline
industry,
President's
Commission on
Terrorism and
Aviation
Security, and
Customs.
Electromagnetic
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quadrupole Radio Commercially $340,000 $1 million
Resonance frequency available. FAA (DOD)
pulses probe has a $350,000 Office
bags to elicit prototype of National Drug
unique capable of Control Policy
responses from detecting two (ONDCP)
explosives and types of $0.7 million
drugs. explosives. (FAA)
Customs has a $1.6 million
Nonimaging prototype Technical
technology capable of Support Working
that provides detecting Group (TSWG)
chemically cocaine base.
specific
detection and
automatically
alarms on
explosives or
drugs.
Currently does
not meet FAA
certification
standards.
Detection of
certain
cocaine
compounds
needs
improvement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was
developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics
detection, or both. Generally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported
explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has
supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows
FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that
technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and
explosives.
\b Not available.
APPLICATION: PASSENGERS\A
========================================================== Appendix II
Characteristic Unit Price Funding (FYs 78-
Technology s Status Range 96)
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ----------------
Electromagnetic:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnetic System is Prototype NA\b $1.3 million
Resonance for nonimaging, developed and (ONDCP)
Drug but will tested at an $123,000
Swallowers automatically airport. (Customs)
alarm if drug Project was
is detected in terminated
the digestive because system
tract of a emitted radio
swallower. frequencies
that
Requires about interfered
30 seconds to with airport
screen a operations and
suspect. Customs
decided
against
spending
additional
$165,000 on
needed
shielding.
System is now
sitting idle
at a Customs'
storage
facility.
Dielectric System will Under $110,000 to $1.6 million
Portal scan 360 development by $200,000 (FAA)
degrees around FAA. Factory
a passenger and airport
and testing to
automatically occur in 1997.
pinpoint the
location of
all undeclared
objects on the
surface of the
body.
System will be
capable of
processing 500
passengers per
hour.
Millimeter System Under $100,000 to $5.3 million
Wave Portal provides 360- development by $200,000 (FAA)
degree imaging FAA. Fieldable
of the human prototype to
body in order be completed
to detect mid-1997 with
weapons, airport
explosives, testing to
and drugs follow.
concealed
underneath
clothing.
System does
not provide
automatic
detection, but
relies on an
operator to
spot the
contraband.
System
expected to
process 360-
600 passengers
per hour.
Trace
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemiluminesce Vacuum wands Under NA\b $4.0 million
nce Portal touching development by (FAA)
clothing FAA. Fieldable
collect vapor prototype
and particles completed in
while 1995. Factory
passengers are and airport
walking testing will
through the begin in late
portal. 1996.
System will
automatically
alarm if
explosive is
detected.
Throughput is
estimated to
be 360 per
hour.
Ion Mobility Air flow Two prototypes $300,000 to $2.5 million
Spectroscopy dislodges are being $500,000 (FAA)
(IMS) Portals vapor or developed by
particles from FAA.
passengers
walking
through
portals to
test for
explosives.
Systems
automatically
alarm if
explosive is
detected.
Throughput
goal is 360
per hour.
IMS Passenger Trace samples Under $65,000 to $125,000 (FAA)
Scanner collected from development by $85,000
passengers' FAA. Field
hands either prototype to
through a be available
token or sometime in
document. 1996.
System will
automatically
alarm if
explosive is
detected.
Throughput is
estimated to
be 425 per
hour.
IMS Document Collects trace Under $65,000 to $430,000 (TSWG)
Screeners samples from development by $85,000
passengers' TSWG. Project
documents. started in
April 1996 and
System will to be
automatically completed in
alarm if 1998.
explosive is
detected.
Throughput is
estimated to
be 450 per
hour.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was
developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics
detection, or both. Generally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported
explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has
supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows
FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that
technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and
explosives.
\b Not available.
APPLICATION: CARRY-ON LUGGAGE\A
========================================================= Appendix III
Characteristic Unit Price Funding (FYs 78-
Technology s Status Range 96)
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ----------------
Trace
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ion Mobility Measures Commercially $45,000 to $2.3 million
Spectroscopy mobility of available. For $152,000 (FAA)
(IMS) various example, 125
chemicals units of a
through a gas particular IMS
in an system have
electrical been deployed
field. overseas.
Fast,
portable, and
inexpensive.
Lower chemical
specificity
than mass
spectrometry.
Combination Combines gas Commercially $100,000 to $2 million
Technologies chromatography available. For $170,000 (FAA)
and mass example, 154 $230,000 (TSWG)
spectrometry units of a
or chemiluminesce
chemiluminesce nce system
nce that have been
separates deployed
mixtures using overseas.
an absorbent
material.
High
sensitivity
and chemical
specificity.
Produces
evidence
acceptable in
court.
Expensive,
slow, and
bulky.
X-rays
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enhanced, low- Do not Under NA\b $325,000 (FAA)
energy X-rays automatically development. $250,000 (TSWG)
alarm, so
dependent on
operator
interpretation
of enhanced
images.
Limited
penetration of
target
objects.
Electromagnetic
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quadrupole Radio Commercially $65,000 This is a
Resonance frequency available. A product derived
pulses probe field from funding the
hags to elicit prototype same technology
unique capable of listed in
responses from handling small appendix I.
explosives and size packages
drugs. was tested in
Atlanta during
Nonimaging the Olympics
technology by airlines to
that provides screen
chemically electronics.
specific
detection and
automatically
alarms on
explosives or
drugs.
Detection of
certain
cocaine
compounds
needs
improvement.
Dielectrometry System uses This is an FAA $19,000 to $77,000 (FAA)
bottle content microwave in-house $25,000
tester technology to project
penetrate working with a
bottles and commercially
will discover available
when bottles device. FAA is
do not contain currently
the liquid testing field
that is prototypes.
expected. It
is basically a
discovery
rather than
detection
system.
System does
not identify
the liquid in
the bottle.
System
throughput is
expected to be
720 bottles
per hour.
However,
system is
unable to
penetrate
certain types
of bottles.
Magnetic Automatically Prototypes are $75,000 to $974,000 (FAA)
Resonance for alarms if available. $125,000
bottle explosives
screening detected.
Analysis time
varies between
20 and 70
seconds per
target.
Manufacturer
is working to
shorten
analysis time.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was
developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics
detection, or both. Generally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported
explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has
supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows
FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that
technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and
explosives.
\b Not available.
APPLICATION: CONTAINERS, TRUCKS,
AND CARGO\A
========================================================== Appendix IV
Characteristic Unit Price Funding (FYs 78-
Technology s Status Range 96)
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ----------------
Nuclear
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear An accelerator Project was NA\b $12.1 million
Resonance generates originally (FAA)
Absorption gamma rays to intended for
penetrate the checked bags
object to be and has been
screened. The inactive since
gamma rays are 1993. FAA may
preferentially reactivate
absorbed by project for
nitrogen screening air
nuclei. A cargo
significant containers.
decrease in
the number of
detected gamma
rays indicates
the possible
presence of
explosives.
System
requires less
shielding than
other nuclear
technologies.
Pulsed Fast An accelerator DOD completed $8 to $10 $19 million
Neutron generates the project, million (DOD)
Analysis neutrons for but the system $ 5.3 million
(8 MeV) bombarding was not (FAA)
target; transitioned $6.2 million
induced gamma to Customs due (TSWG)
rays are to Customs'
measured to concern with
detect cost, size,
presence of operational,
narcotics or and safety
explosives. issues. FAA
conducted
System limited
automatically testing for
alarms based checked
on 3 baggage
dimensional application in
images of 1993 and it is
elemental now
ratios of considering a
hydrogen, new project
oxygen, for screening
nitrogen, and air cargo.
carbon. TSWG is
funding a
System takes counterterrori
20 minutes per sm
analysis and application.
would
typically be
combined with
an X-ray
system to
speed
throughput.
Requires a
large amount
of space and
shielding, a
radiation
permit, and an
FDA permit for
use on food.
Pulsed Fast Also uses an FAA has two NA\b $3.5 million
Neutron accelerator to ongoing (FAA)
Radiography generate fast projects and
neutrons to now believes
probe bags; technology
measurement of might be more
the suitable for
transmitted screening air
neutron cargo or
spectrum is containerized
used to detect checked
explosives. baggage than
individual
bags.
Gamma Ray System is Prototype About $400,000 $382,000 (ONDCP)
Scanning designed for being
(Up to 10 MeV) propane and evaluated by
other gas or DOD and
liquid tanker Customs.
trucks but is
adaptable to
scan
railcars.
While open and
unsheltered,
system
requires a
radiation
permit to
operate.
X-Ray
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High energy, Systems are Commercially $12 to $15 $15 million
fixed-site designed to available. DOD million (DOD)
systems (5 - scan loaded completed the $224,000
10 million trucks/ project in (Customs)
electron containers and Tacoma,
volts--MeV) have Washington,
throughput of but system was
12-25 per hour not
depending on transitioned
configurations to Customs due
. to Customs'
concerns with
Required cost, safety,
extensive and
shielding, operational
radiation issues.
permit, and
FDA permit if
used on food.
System relies
on operator's
interpretation
of the X-ray
images.
Low energy System is Commercially $3 million $3.7 million
fixed-site designed to available. (DOD)
system with scan empty Customs has
backscatter trucks or deployed one
(450 thousand containers. machine at
electron Otay Mesa,
volts--KeV) Throughput is California,
about six and plans to
trucks per deploy up to
hour. 11 more along
the Southwest
Relies on border.
operator's
interpretation
of the X-Ray
images.
Mobile/ Systems are DOD is testing $1.75 to $6 $10.8 million
relocatable designed to 450 KeV system million (DOD)
systems (450 scan empty or and still
KeV to 2 MeV) loaded trucks developing
and containers machines at
depending on other energy
the energy levels.
level and to
complement the
fixed-site X-
ray systems.
A 1 MeV system
is designed
for aircraft
size cargo
containers.
May also be
useful for
scanning
passenger
vehicles.
Electromagnetic
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magnetic Radio Abandoned NA\b $130,000
Resonance frequency wave machine is in (Customs)
probes storage at
objects, major
except that a Southeastern
magnet aligns seaport.
hydrogen atoms
prevalent in
liquids.
Abandoned FAA
prototype for
checked
baggage was
modified for
Customs to
scan frozen
shrimp
packages.
Machine short-
circuited
during storm
and Customs
decided
against
spending for
machine
repair.
Trace
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vapor/ Systems are Many $2,500 to $240,000
Particle based on gas commercially $170,000 (Customs)
Detection chromatography available. DOD $2.4 million
systems , is developing (TSWG)
chemiluminesce some $4.7 million
nce, mass prototypes for (DOD)
spectroscopy, use by
surface Customs.
acoustic wave,
ion mobility
spectroscopy,
and biosensor
technologies.
Sample
collection
steps are
highly
critical for
the
effectiveness
of systems.
Most existing
systems use
vacuum or
wiping with a
swab.
Most existing
systems are
not currently
capable of
detecting the
extremely low
vapor
pressures of
cocaine and
heroin.
Barometric System differs Under NA\b $1.8 million
chamber with from other development by (TSWG)
chemiluminesce vapor FAA. A
nce detector detectors in fieldable
that it draws prototype is
air sample expected to be
from a tested by
barometric October 1996.
chamber into
which the
object to be
inspected has
been shaken
and subjected
to heat
cycles.
System
automatically
alarms if
explosive is
detected.
System may not
work on a
tightly sealed
object.
High volume System Under $35,000 to $1.3 million
sample concentrates development by $42,000 (FAA)
collection 400 litres of FAA.
with a air to .5 cc
biosensor of liquid.
detector
Biosensor
specifically
identifies the
explosives
detected.
System is
suitable for
use in cargo
holds and
interiors of
aircraft, etc.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Funding column indicates whether a specific technology was
developed or is being developed for explosives detection, narcotics
detection, or both. Genrally, FAA and TSWG funding has supported
explosives detection, while funding by DOD, Customs, and ONDCP has
supported narcotics detection. Where a technology funding cell shows
FAA or TSWG in combination with DOD, Customs, or ONDCP, that
technology is generally capable of detecting both narcotics and
explosives.
\b Not available.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix V
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
John P. K. Ting
Charles D. Groves
John K. Harper
Ernest A. Doring
David E. Cooper
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Thomas F. Noone
Matthew E. Hampton
Marnie S. Shaul
Gerald L. Dillingham
*** End of document. ***
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